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RESOLVING THE CLASH BETWEEN
TRADEMARKS AND DOMAIN NAMES
William H. Brewster,* James A. Trigg** & John R.
Renaud***
I. INTRODUCTION
The meteoric rise of the Internet during the 1990's
brought with it a new form of trademark infringement known
as cybersquatting.' This practice typically involves ethically
suspect people who register domain names incorporating
well-known trademarks, with the hope of selling these do-
main names to the trademark owners at grossly inflated
prices.2 Until 1999, trademark owners faced limited options
in pursuing these domain name pirates, and were often forced
to rely upon ill-fitting theories of trademark dilution and
trademark infringement in litigation.' Although courts gen-
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1. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493
(2d Cir. 2001).
2. See id.
3. These theories were "ill-fitting" in that both trademark infringement
and trademark dilution rely or are premised on a defendant's use of a mark in
commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2001) ("Any person who shall, without the
consent of the registrant (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy
or colorable imitation of a registered mark . . . ."); 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a) (1) ("Any
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erally were sympathetic to the plaintiffs in these actions,4 ex-
isting trademark law was not well equipped to combat cyber-
squatting.' In response, the Internet Corporation for As-
person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for
goods, uses in commerce.... ."). The passive registration of a domain name,
without more, is generally not considered to be a genuine trademark "use." See,
e.g., Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp
1276, 1279 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ("The mere registration of a domain name does not
constitute a commercial use.").
4. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, Inc. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal.
1996), affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that defendant's registration
of <panavision.com> diluted plaintiffs trademark rights in mark
PANAVISION); Wash. Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Authorities, Inc., 33 F.
Supp. 2d 488 (E.D. Va. 1999) (finding infringement where defendant registered
<washingtonspeakers.com> and other similar domain names for use in connec-
tion with services similar to those provided by plaintiff under the mark
WASHINGTON SPEAKERS BUREAU); Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc. v.
Tele-tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding that defendant's reg-
istration of <teletech.com> diluted plaintiffs rights in mark TELETECH);
Green Prods. Co. v. Independence Corn By-Prods. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D.
Iowa 1997) (finding competitor's registration of <greenproducts.com> to be in-
fringing on ground that it was likely to create confusion with plaintiffs GREEN
PRODUCTS mark); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (finding that defendant's registration of <intermatic.com> diluted plain-
tiffs trademark rights in mark INTERMATIC); Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm't
Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (holding that defendant's
registration of <candyland.com> for use in connection with pornographic web-
site diluted plaintiffs rights in CANDYLAND mark). But see Avery Dennison
Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999) (reversing lower court's finding
of dilution and holding defendant's registrations of <avery.com> and <denni-
son.com>, among many other registrations of common last names, to be nonin-
fringing); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass.
1999) (declining to order transfer of <clue.com> to owner of famous CLUE board
game where defendant found to have legitimate rights in mark CLUE for use in
connection with computer consulting services).
5. See Alanna C. Rutherford, Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Market: A Case
Study in Internet Regulation Gone Awry, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 421, 441 (2000)("[C]ourts have continuously disposed of the fame requirement in little more
than a few sentences or, with the skills of contortionists, found fame where none
existed."); Christopher R. Perry, Trademarks as Commodities: The "Famous"
Roadblock to Applying Trademark Dilution Law in Cyberspace, 32 CONN. L.
REV. 1127, 1148 (2000) ("[TIhe courts have not held trademarks up to the high
standard for a finding of famousness that Congress envisioned when it enacted
the FTDA."); Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The New Wild West: Measuring and Prov-
ing Fame and Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 63 ALB. L.
REV. 201, 211 (1999) ("[S]ome courts have exhibited sympathy for the 'big fish in
a small pond' and have erroneously accorded famous status to locally recognized
marks."); Scott N. Barker, Famous.com: Applying the FTDA to Internet Domain
Names, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 265, 281 (1997) ("Because of their limited num-
ber and global reach, domain names are particularly susceptible to an overly
broad interpretation of the FTDA.").
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signed Names and Numbers ("ICANN") established a dispute
resolution policy that virtually all domain registrars have
since adopted,6 and Congress passed the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA" or the "Act").7 These de-
velopments have made it much easier for plaintiffs to stop cy-
bersquatting, and may ultimately destroy-or at least sharply
restrict-the cybersquatting industry.
Today, trademark owners may select from several differ-
ent legal mechanisms to fight cybersquatting. Each has its
own set of advantages and limitations that should be consid-
ered before initiating a proceeding. This paper seeks to high-
light and contrast the substantive requirements of each
mechanism, the processes and discovery techniques available
to litigants, and the advantages and pitfalls associated with
each of these legal tools.
II. ICANN DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES
Of the different means for resolving domain name dis-
putes, some commentators tout the ICANN-approved dispute
resolution service as the cheapest and most time efficient.8
ICANN is a non-profit, private-sector corporation created in
1998 by the U.S. Department of Commerce for the purpose of
preserving the operational stability of the Internet, and it
specifically coordinates the assignment of internet domain
names, IP address numbers, protocol parameters, and port
numbers .'
6. See ICANN website, at httpJ/www.icann.org/udrp/ (updated Aug. 26,
2001) ("All registrars in the .biz, .com, .info, .name, net, and .org top-level do-
mains follow the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy. ... ").
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp. V 1999).
8. See Sandra Edelman, Cybersquatting Claims Take Center Stage, 18
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW 1, 5 (2001) ("[An ICANN proceeding] is simpler,
far cheaper, and quicker."); see also ICANN Second Staff Report on Implemen-
tation Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (Oct. 25, 1999), at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm ("the adopted
policy establishes a streamlined, inexpensive administrative dispute-resolution
procedure . . ").
9. ICANN makes decisions through its Board of Directors, who are elected
from several supporting organizations, and who are advised by several commit-
tees. See Virtual Countries v. Rep. of S. Afr., 148 F. Supp. 2d 254 (S.D.N.Y.
2001). The Board is composed of nineteen directors: nine At-Large Directors,
nine selected by ICANN's three supporting organizations, and the Presi-
dent/CEO. See ICANN's web page, at http://www.icann.org (updated Nov. 28,
2001). WIPO is a specialized agency of the United Nations that administers in-
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To address the problem of cybersquatting, ICANN prom-
ulgated a Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
("Policy") and the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy ("Rules").1" These rules replaced the dispute
resolution procedure utilized by Network Solutions, which
until 1999 was the lone registrar of generic Top Level Domain
Names ("gTLDs").1" ICANN approves dispute-resolution
service providers ("DRSPs") who conduct the administrative
proceedings involving domain name disputes. 2 These DRSPs
are bound to conduct the administrative proceedings in ac-
cordance with the Policy and the Rules. 3 Four DRSPs have
currently been approved in the ICANN system: the World In-
tellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), 4 The National
Arbitration Forum ("NAF"),"5 Disputes.org/eResolution Con-
sortium ("eResolution"),'6 and CPR Institute of Dispute
Resolution ("CPR")." WIPO has been the most frequently se-
lected DRSP. 8
ternational treaties concerning intellectual property protection, and is also in-
volved in the development of Internet domain name policy, by preparing reports
and recommendations based upon submissions of its members and commentary
by private sector members of the Internet community. See Virtual Countries,
148 F. Supp. at 259. For more information on this organization, see the ICANN
site at http://www.icann.org. The ICANN Policy and Rules discussed in this pa-
per are available through the ICANN site.
10. See ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Oct. 24,
1999), at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm [hereinafter
ICANN Policy]; ICANN Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (Oct. 24, 1999), at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm
[hereinafter ICANN Rules].
11. The gTLDs are administered by ICANN, and are available for registra-
tion on a worldwide basis. Until 2001, ".com," .org," and ".net" were the only
generally available gTLDs. Two more gTLDs, ".biz" and ".info," will be acti-
vated in late 2001.
12. See ICANN's website, at http://www.icann.org.
13. Id.
14. See ICANN website, at http.//www.icann.orgudrp/approved-
providers.htm (updated Nov. 28, 2001). For more information about WIPO's
ICANN services, see WIPO's website at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/ (visited
Nov. 30, 2001).
15. For more information about NAF's ICANN services, visit NAF's website
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/ (visited Nov. 30, 2001).
16. For more information about eResolution's ICANN services, see
http://www.eresolution.ca (last updated Nov. 15, 2001).
17. For more information about CPR's ICANN services, see
http://www.cpradr.org (last updated Nov. 28, 2001).
18. Of the more than 3,400 proceedings filed through the ICANN mecha-
nism as of April 9, 2001, nearly 2,100 were filed with WIPO. Approximately
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Each of the four DRSPs has adopted supplemental rules
that address the mechanics of their services, containing in-
formation about fees,19 word and page limits, and the means
for communicating with the parties involved. Each DRSP al-
lows complainants to select either a one-member dispute
resolution panel or a three-member panel, the latter being
more expensive.2" If the complainant selects a single-member
panel, but the respondent later requests a three-member
panel, the costs for the action are split evenly between the
parties.2' Otherwise, the complainant bears the cost of the ac-
tion. The Policy and the Rules do not provide for the recovery
of damages or of any fees or costs from the losing party.
Under the Policy, complainants must submit a complaint
in both hard copy and electronic form to the DRSP Board.
Section 3 of the Rules lists in detail the specific information
that must appear in the complaint: (1) the names of the dis-
puted domains; (2) the trademark or service mark on which
the claim is based; (3) the preferred means of receiving com-
munications (both electronic and hard copies); and (4) a
statement of the remedies sought, which are limited to a
transfer of the domain name registration to the complainant,
or cancellation of the name.22 Additionally, the complainant
must consent to a court of "Mutual Jurisdiction," which the
Rules define as one located where the domain registrar's
principal office is located, or where the challenged domain
name holder is located, based on the address it submitted as
part of the registration.2 This consent to jurisdiction becomes
relevant when a losing respondent wishes to challenge a
1,100 actions were filed with NAF. Of the remaining actions filed, just over 200
were submitted with eResolution, and only 22 had been filed with CPR, which
was the fourth DRSP to be established. See http://www.icann.org.
19. As of this writing, the cost of filing a complaint to be decided for a single
panelist is approximately $750.00 - $1,500.00.
20. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 4(g); ICANN Rules, supra note 10,
9 3, 6.
21. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 91 4(g).
22. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 4(i). Complainants have over-
whelmingly chosen to seek transfer of disputed domain names, as opposed to
merely canceling them, which would leave them available for someone else to
use. As of November 2001, out of the 2159 cases where the complainant has
prevailed, only 30 domain names have been cancelled. See Statistical Summary
of Proceedings, at httpJ/www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.ht (last updated
Nov. 29, 2001).
23. See ICANN Rules, supra note 10, $ 1, 3(b)(xiii).
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DRSP's decision in federal court.24 The DRSPs, in turn, are
responsible for serving the respondent in a manner calculated
to achieve actual notice, which is generally met if service is
sent to all postal addresses shown in the registrar's database,
and sent in electronic form to the e-mail address listed in the
respondent's registration.
25
As for discovery, the ICANN system provides very little.
The DRSP has the discretion to request documents or state-
ments from the parties, but no in-person hearings or confer-
ences typically occur. 6 Because of the lack of any hearing, all
the parties' arguments necessarily must be raised in the com-
plaint or the response. A review of posted decisions reveals
that some panels allow additional submissions, 7 and some do
not," although the NAF Supplemental Rules provide com-
plainants with the opportunity to submit reply materials as of
right, provided that such materials are submitted within five
days of the respondent's response. 9 Under the Rules, the
24. See Virtuality L.L.C. v. Bata Ltd., 138 F. Supp. 2d 677 (D. Md. 2001).
There the court stated, "[Wihen it filed its complaint under the ICANN Policy
and Rules, defendant Bata consented to the jurisdiction of a court selected by it
for consideration of any challenge to a decision in the administrative proceed-
ing." Id. at 683. With respect to the plaintiffs state claims of conversion, slan-
der, and fraud, the court noted the question "involves quite different considera-
tions," meaning analysis of Maryland's long arm statute, and minimum
contacts. Id. The court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the state
law claims. See id. at 684.
25. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 2(a).
26. See ICANN Rules, supra note 10, T 13 ("There shall be no in-person
hearings (including hearings by teleconference, videoconference, and web con-
ference), unless the Panel determines, in its sole discretion and as an excep-
tional matter, that such a hearing is necessary for deciding the complaint.").
27. See CSA Int'l v. Shannon., WIPO Case No. D2000-0071 (Mar. 24, 2000)
(allowing a "Clarification to the Complaint" and a "Revised Response"), avail-
able at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0071.html;
Georgia Gulf Corp. v. The Ross Group, WIPO Case No. D2000-0218 (June 14,
2000) (allowing additions to the complaint and the response), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2OOO-O218.html.
28. See Easyjet Airline Co. v. Andrew Steggles, WIPO Case No. D2000-0024
(March 17, 2000) (finding that additional submissions are only allowed if re-
quested by the panel), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0024.html; Julia
Fiona Roberts v. Russell Body, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210 (May 29, 2000)
(panel decided not to consider complainant's reply), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisionsthtml/2000/d2000-O210.html.
29. See The National Arbitration Forum's Supplemental Rules to ICANN's
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at Rule 7 (effective Oct. 15,
2001), available at httpJ/arbforum.com/domains/UDRP/rules.asp.
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panel should issue its decision in writing within fourteen days
of the submission of all papers,"° and the decisions then are
published on the DRSP's web site.3
The ICANN Policy has been adopted by all accredited
domain-name registrars for domain names ending in .com,
.net, and .org, and has been adopted by certain managers of
country-code top-level domains, such as: .at (Austria), .bs
(Bahamas), .ca (Canada) and .th (Thailand)." The Policy op-
erates between the registrars and the holder of the domain
name registration, and all holders of domain name registra-
tions take these names subject to the terms of the Policy.3
The Policy states that by applying for a domain name regis-
tration, the applicant represents that, to the best of the appli-
cant's knowledge, its domain name does not "infringe upon or
otherwise violate the rights of any third party."34 The Policy
states the three circumstances when the registrar will cancel
or transfer a domain name registration: (1) if the owner con-
sents; (2) if a court orders such a transfer; or (3) if an admin-
istrative panel of an approved DRSP decides such a transfer
is warranted.35
The Policy requires all holders to submit to a mandatory
administrative proceeding if a third party complainant as-
serts that the domain name was wrongfully obtained."b To
prevail in the action, the complainant must establish each of
the following elements:
(i) [the holder's] domain name is identical or confusingly
similar to a trademark or service mark in which the com-
plainant has rights; and
(ii) [the holder has] no rights or legitimate interests in re-
spect of the domain name; and
(iii) [the holder's] domain name has been registered and is
30. As a practical matter, the authors note that this fourteen-day require-
ment is not always observed.
31. Harvard Law School's Berkman Center for Internet & Society provides
an excellent web site, at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/search-udrp.html, for re-
searching the opinions of all four DRSPs.
32. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, introductory notes.
33. See id.
34. See id. 2.
35. See id. 1 3.
36. See id. 4.
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used in bad faith.37
A. Identical or Confusing Similarity
The first element that a complainant must show is that
the respondent's domain name is "identical or confusingly
similar" to the complainant's trademark or service mark.38
The Policy does not require the complainant to have a regis-
tered mark. Although the Policy specifically mentions trade-
marks and service marks, and not other intangible rights,
some panel decisions have effectively allowed publicity rights
to be asserted.39
Because most of the published opinions involve names
very close to each other, the "identical or confusingly similar"
element has not generated much argument. A typical case is
Gateway, Inc. v. James Cadieux," where the respondent reg-
istered <pcgateway.com> and <pcgateway.net>, which were
found to be confusingly similar to the complainant's regis-
tered marks.41 Because cybersquatters often register the
trademarks of well-known companies in conjunction with
other terms, especially Internet-oriented lingo such as "on-
line," "web," or "www,"42 a complainant improves its chances
of success by demonstrating ownership of a family of marks.
When faced with a family of marks, a respondent is much less
likely to avoid a transfer by including a potentially distin-
guishing term. 3 In determining confusing similarity, the
37. See id.
38. ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 1 4(a)(i).
39. See Julia Fiona Roberts v. Russell Body, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210
(May 29, 2000) (granting transfer of <juliaroberts.com>), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html; Kidman v.
Zuccarini, WIPO Case No. D2000-1415 (Jan. 23, 2001) (granting transfer of
<nicolekidman.com> and <nicolekidmannude.com>), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d20001415.html. In many
of these cases, the panel found that the complainant's name functioned as a
"common law" mark.
40. WIPO Case No. D2000-0198 (May 25, 2000), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000O198.html.
41. See id. 6(c).
42. One particularly insidious form of bad faith involves registering a fa-
mous trademark with the prefix "www," but without the all-important period, or
"dot," thus causing web surfers who forget to type the period to be diverted
away from their intended website. See TPI Holdings v. AFX Communications,
WIPO Case No. D2000-1472 (Feb. 2, 2001), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-l472.html.
43. See Bellsouth Intellectual Prop. Corp. v. Freeworld, WIPO Case No.
[V01.42
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DRSP panel decisions typically do not analyze the goods and
services, the channels, of trade, or any of the other factors
common in a traditional likelihood of confusion determina-
tion." Rather, the panel assesses the marks alone without a
market context. This narrowed focus advances the purpose of
the Policy: if the Policy required the comparison of goods or
services, then cybersquatters could easily avoid the transfer
by not offering any goods or services.45
On occasion, complainants fail to establish confusing
similarity, especially if the complainant's mark is found to be
weak, or when the respondent presents evidence of many
third-party uses of the mark. For example, in Reed Publish-
ing v. Select Gourmet Foods, Inc., the panel found that the re-
spondent's domain registration for <whoiswhoinlaw.com> and
<whoiswhoinpolitics.com> was not confusingly similar to
complainant's WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN LAW and
WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN POLITICS trademarks." The
panel rationalized that the respondent's domain names were
not limited geographically, as were the complainant's, and
that the evidence demonstrated numerous third-party uses of
the "who's who" motif without geographical limitations. 7
In other cases, panels have found that domain names in-
corporating a trademark followed by the term "sucks" are not
confusingly similar to the asserted mark. For example, in
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Dan Parisi,48 the panel declined to
transfer the domain names <lockheedsucks.com> and <lock-
heedmartinsucks.com>, noting, "[b]oth common sense and a
reading of the plain language of the Policy support the view
that a domain name combining a trademark with the word
'sucks'.. . cannot be considered confusingly similar to the
D2000-1807 (Mar. 14, 2001), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.intfdomains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1807.html.
44. See Fed. Cartridge Co. v. Madmouse Communications, WIPO Case No.
D2001-0756 (July 24, 2001), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-O756.html.
45. In fact, in the author's collective experience, few respondents in ICANN
proceedings actually offer any goods or services for sale via their websites.
46. See Reed Publ'g v. Select Gourmet Foods, Inc., CPR File No. CPRO04
(Aug. 29, 2000), available at http://www.cpradr.org.
47. Id. at 2.
48. WIPO Case No. D2000-1015 (Jan. 26, 2001), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d200l-lO15.html.
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trademark. '49 However, it should be noted that not all panels
have adopted such a respondent-friendly view with respect to
"sucks" domain names."
B. Respondent Has No Legitimate Interests in the Domain
Name
The ICANN Policy requires the complainant to establish
a second element that the holder of the disputed domain
name has "no rights or legitimate interests in the domain
name.""' While according to the Policy, Complainant has the
burden of establishing all elements of the claim, under the
Rules a complainant can discharge this burden by stating the
reason "why [the respondent] should be considered as having
no rights or legitimate interests" in the domain name.52 If the
complainant has a federally registered trademark, it can as-
sert a nationwide constructive notice to demonstrate the re-
spondent's lack of legitimate rights or interests in the domain
name.
53
If the complainant states a credible reason why the re-
spondent has no legitimate interests, the panel generally ex-
pects the respondent to demonstrate that it indeed does have
a legitimate interest. Nandos International Ltd. v. M Fareed
Farukhi" is a good example of this shifting burden. In this
49. Id. 6. See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. wallmartcanadasucks.com,
WIPO Case No. D2000-1104 (Nov. 23, 2000) (refusing to transfer "sucks" do-
main name), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/
2000/d2000-1104.html.
50. See Diageo P.L.C. v. Zuccarini, WIPO Case No. D2000-0996 (Oct. 22,
2000) (transferring <guinness-sucks.com>, <guinness-really-sucks.com>, and
others), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0996.html; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. MacLeod, WIPO Case No. D2000-0662
(Sept. 19, 2000) (transferring <wal-martsucks.com>), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0662.html; Cabela's,
Inc. v. Cupcake Patrol, NAF No. FA0006000095080 (Aug. 29, 2000) (transfer-
ring <cabelassucks.com>), available at http://arbforum.comdomains/decisions/
95080.htm.
51. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 1 4(a)(ii).
52. See ICANN Rules, supra note 10, 9T 3(b)(ix)(2).
53. See Sunfest v. Elec. Sys. Techs., Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0631 (Oct.
3, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0631.html; J. Crew Int'l v. crew.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-0054 (Apr. 20,
2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html]2000/d2000-
0054.html.
54. Nandos Int'l Ltd. v. M. Fareed Farukhi, WIPO Case No. D2000-0225
(May 23, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/
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decision, the complainant stated that it filed a U.S. trade-
mark application for the mark NANDO'S at least five years
before the respondent registered the domain names
<nando.com> and <nandoschicken.com>, and the respondent
did not submit evidence that he had an interest in the name.
The panel reasoned,
Admittedly the obligation to prove that the Respondent
has no rights or legitimate interests in respect to the do-
main name, lies on the Complainant. But it would be of
assistance to a Panel deciding the issue if the Respondent
were to give an indication of the basis of his claim of right
when that is denied by the Complainant. After all, knowl-
edge of that fact is peculiarly within the Respondent's
knowledge."'
The panel then concluded that since the respondent "has not
been able to produce any evidence of this kind," he did not
have a legitimate interest in the domain name.56
The Policy gives guidance to respondents seeking to dem-
onstrate their interests by setting forth three indicia of le-
gitimate rights or interests. In essence, showing a legitimate
interest in the domain name defeats the second prong." This
also undermines the charge of bad faith: if a party has a le-
gitimate interest in a name, then it likely did register in good
faith. This "good faith" defense is available if the respondent
can demonstrate any of the following circumstances:
(i) before any notice to [the holder] of the dispute, [the
holder's] use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the
domain name or a name corresponding to the domain
name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or
services; or
d2000-0225.html; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Walmarket Canada, WIPO
Case No. D2000-0150 (May 2, 2000), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0150.html; Jordan
Grand Prix Ltd. v. Gerry Sweeney, WIPO Case No. D2000-0233 (May 11, 2000),
available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0233.html; AT&T Corp. v. Tala Alamuddin, WIPO Case No. D2000-0249
(May 18, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/
d2000-0249.html; Stella D'oro Biscuit Co. v. The Patron Group, Inc., WIPO Case
No. D2000-0012 (Feb. 17, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/
decisions/html/2000/d2000-0012.html.
55. Nando's Int'l Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2000-0225 at 5.
56. Id.
57. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 4(c).
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(ii) [the holder] (as an individual, business, or other or-
ganization) [has] been commonly known by the domain
name, even if [the holder has] acquired no trademark or
service mark rights; or
(iii) [the holder is] making a legitimate noncommercial or
fair use of the domain name, without intent for commer-
cial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish
the trademark or service mark at issue.58
Under the first prong, if the respondent can show it was
selling goods bearing the mark before it knew of the dispute,
then the panel will determine that the respondent has legiti-
mate rights. If the respondent has adopted a generic term
describing the goods he sells, then a panel is more apt to find
legitimate rights. For example in Eauto, L.L.C. v. Triple S.
Auto Parts, the respondent had been selling auto lamps and
decided to market them on the web.59 The panel decided that
"eautolamps" was an example of an Internet-based descrip-
tion of a generic product because "the letter 'e' preceding [a
product] has come to be understood as an electronic, Internet-
based form of the same."" Thus the panelist held for the re-
spondent. Similarly, in Deutsche Welle v. DiamondWare Ltd.,
the panel refused to transfer a domain name because the re-
spondent's registration predated its awareness of the com-
plainant.6' As the language of the Policy makes clear, if the
respondent has made "demonstrable preparations" to market
the goods and services at issue, then this will constitute le-
gitimate rights. 2 However, at least two panels have deter-
mined that merely using the domain name to link to other
sites does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or serv-
ices."
58. ICANN Policy, supra note 10, $ 4(c).
59. See Eauto, L.L.C. v. Triple S. Auto Parts, WIPO Case No. D2000-0047
(Mar. 24, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/
2000/d2000-0047.html.
60. Id.
61. See Deutche Welle v. DiamondWare Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2000-1202
(Jan. 2, 2001), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/
d2000-1202.html.
62. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, $ 4(c)(i).
63. See Sunfest v. Elec. Sys. Techs., Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0631 (Oct.
3, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0631.html; Easyjet Airline Co. v. Steggles, WIPO Case No. D2000-0024 (Mar.
17, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/
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The second "legitimate interest" prong of the Policy gives
protection to respondents who register domains for their
commonly known name, even if they have not acquired
trademark rights in the name. 4 This clause protects compa-
nies that do not use their company name in conjunction with
their goods or services, and thus may not have trademark
rights in the name, yet they register the company name as
part of a domain name. An effort to register a common name
in such circumstances negates the intent to pirate the rights
of others, which is the narrow target of the ICANN system."
For example, in Digitronics Inventioneering Corp. v.
@Six.Net Registered,"6 the panel upheld the respondent's right
to the domains <sixnet.com> and <six.net> based on evidence
that the respondent was commonly known as "Six.net," which
gave it legitimate interests. 7 However, it is unclear how
much evidence is necessary for the respondent to establish
that it is commonly known by a particular name. In Gordon
Sumner, p/k/a Sting v. Michael Urvan," the panel deter-
mined that respondent's evidence that he used "Sting" as a
nickname and as a username did not demonstrate that he
was commonly known as "Sting."9
The third legitimate interest prong of the Policy protects
legitimate non-commercial, or fair use, of the domain name so
long as there is no intent to divert customers or tarnish the
trademark rights of others for commercial gain.7" This de-
fense is commonly invoked, but is rarely successful, especially
if the respondent is also selling goods in addition to criticizing
d2000-0024.html.
64. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 1 4(c)(ii).
65. See ICANN website, at http://www.icann.orgludrp/ (updated Aug. 26,
2001) (describing the purpose of the ICANN system as preventing "abusive"
registrations).
66. Digitronics Inventioneering Corp. v. @Six.Net Registered, WIPO Case
No. D2000-0008 (Mar. 1, 2000), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-OOO8.html.
67. Id.; see also Deutche Welle v. DiamondWare Ltd., WIPO Case No.
D2000-1202 (Jan. 2, 2001) (noting that respondent's use of <dw.com> simply
reflected the initials of respondent's trade name), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisions/html/2000/d2OOO-1202.html.
68. Sumner v. Urvan, WIPO Case No. D2000-0596 (July 19, 2000), available
at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0596.html.
69. Id. Instead, the panel viewed this as a factor negating bad faith, and
refused to transfer the name.
70. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 4(c)(iii).
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the trademark owner. The Monty and Pat Roberts, Inc. v. Bill
Keith decision is a good example of a case in which the re-
spondent's assertion of a free speech right to use a domain
name was rejected.71 The panel stated "the fact that respon-
dent's primary motive for establishing its site may be to criti-
cize complainant does not insulate respondent from the fact
that it is directly and indirectly offering products for sale. 72
In Hunton & Williams v. American Distribution Systems,
Inc., the panel rejected the respondent's free speech defense
where the website clearly criticized the complainant.73  Re-
spondent's domain names, <huntonandwilliams.com> and
<huntonwilliams.com>, led to a website that displayed the
following language: "PARASITES - no soul . . no con-
science.., no spine... NO PROBLEM!!!"74 The panel re-
jected the respondent's "parody" defense by stating that "the
content posted by respondent does not constitute the imita-
tion of any distinctive style of the Firm. The content is
merely disparagement of the Firm as greedy, parasitical and
unethical.""
In Mission KwaSizabantu v. Benjamin Rost, the com-
plainant sought to have the domain names <KwaSiza-
bantu.com>, <KwaSizabantu.org>, and <KwaSizabantu.net>
transferred from the registrant, who stated that he was a
part of group of former members of a religious sect who had a
falling out with the complainant." The panel determined
that the respondents' posting of critical views of the com-
plainant amounted to "tarnishing the activities associated
with the trademark or service mark 'KwaSizabantu" even
absent any evidence or allegation that respondent intended to
gain commercially from this criticism. To reach this result,
the panelist narrowly interpreted Paragraph 4(c)(iii) of the
71. Monty and Pat Roberts, Inc. v. Keith, WIPO Case No. D20000-0299
(June 9, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/
d2000-0299.html.
72. Id. at 10.
73. See Hunton & Williams v. Am. Distribution Sys., WIPO Case No.
D2000-0501 (Aug. 1, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/
decisions/html/2000/d2000-0501.html.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id. at 8.
76. See Mission KwaSizabantu v. Rost, WIPO Case No. D2000-0279 (June 7,
2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0279.html.
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Policy, reasoning that the respondent must show (1) he has a
legitimate non-commercial (or fair) use; (2) his use is without
intent for commercial gain; (3) his use is without intent to
misleadingly divert consumers; and (4) his use is without in-
tent to tarnish the trademark.77 According to the panel, re-
spondent must show all these elements conjunctively; how-
ever, it is just as reasonable to interpret the clause to protect
registrants that criticize so long as the criticism is done with-
out the intent to misleadingly divert consumers for commer-
cial gain or tarnish for commercial gain." This interpretation
would allow criticism of a trademark so long as it was done
without intent for commercial gain, which is the essence of
fair use. Under the Mission KwaSizabantu Panel's interpre-
tation, non-commercial criticism of a company that incorpo-
rates a complainant's trademark is not protected as fair use
under Paragraph 4(c)(iii) of the ICANN Policy. This approach
is somewhat insensitive to the free speech interests the Policy
clearly seeks to protect.
While the published ICANN decisions reveal a tendency
by some panels to interpret the fair use defense narrowly,79
other respondents have used it successfully. In Bridgestone
Firestone, Inc. v. Jack Meyers," the panel refused to transfer
the domain name <bridgestone-firestone.net> where the re-
77. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
78. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 4(c)(e).
79. In addition to the decisions discussed above, the fair use defense was
rejected in the following decisions: Quick Works, Inc. v. Micheal J. Maccini,
NAF No. FA 0006000094963 (July 13, 2000) (rejecting respondent's defense
where he used the domain names <quirkmazda.com> and <quirkvolks-
wagen.com> to criticize the complaint's automobile dealership), available at
http://www.arbitration-forum.com/domains/decisions/94963.htm; Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Hanna Law Office, WIPO Case No. D2000-0669 (Sept. 8, 2000)
(transferring <searsroebuck.com> because "the domain name itself contains no
communicative message or expression of Respondent's right to air its negative
opinions about Complainant"), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0669.html; Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Walsucks, WIPO Case No. D2000-0477 (July 20, 2000) (transfer-
ring a series of "walmartsucks" domain names due to Respondent's abuses),
available at http:/arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/htmlV2000/d2000-
0477.html; Tryg-Baltica Forsikring v. Domain ID, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-
0645 (Nov. 7, 2000) (rejecting fair use defense because the domain name had not
yet been used), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-O645.html.
80. Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. v. Jack Meyers, WIPO Case No. D2000-0190
(July 6, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.inttdomains/decisions/html/
2000/d2000-0190.html.
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spondent "has not usurped the <.com> domain but has util-
ized only the <.net> domain, has posted disclaimers on the
website homepage, and has included criticism and commen-
tary on the site so that a reasonably prudent internet user
can tell the site is not the trademark holder's 'official' site."8'
Another example of a successful fair use defense is West-
ern Hay Co. v. Carl Forester." In that case, the respondent
was a former jockey and the creator of a web-based discussion
group located at <westernhay.com>, which sought to educate
others on how to properly take care of horses, and touted the
merits of hay grown in the western United States." Com-
plainant Western Hay Company sold "fine horse and dairy
products."84 The panel declined to transfer the respondent's
domain name, in part because it displayed non-commercial
speech and did not sell any goods.85
Because panel decisions tend to be skeptical of claims of
fair use, even legitimate efforts to criticize a trademark
owner's conduct are vulnerable in an ICANN proceeding.
This area is one of the substantive areas where ICANN and
the ACPA may yield different results. As will be discussed
further below, federal judges applying the ACPA tend to be
more sensitive to the interests of free speech.
C. Establishing Bad Faith
Even if the complainant shows that the respondent holds
a domain name that is confusingly similar to the complain-
ant's trademark and that the respondent has no legitimate
rights or interests in the mark, the complainant still must es-
tablish that the respondent has registered and is using the
domain name in "bad faith."86
The "use" requirement causes concern for complainants
because the Policy does not clearly define this term. If
trademark owners must show that the domain name regis-
trant has actually established a website at the address, or is
81. Id. at 5.
82. Western Hay Co. v. Carl Forester, NAF No. FA0001000093466 (Mar. 3,
2000), available at http://www.arbitration-forum.com/domains/decisions/
93466.htm.
83. See id. at 2.
84. Id. at 1.
85. Id. at 3.
86. ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 4(a)(iii).
[Vol.42
20011 TRADEMARKS AND DOMAIN NAMES 79
selling goods or services at the site, then many cybersquatters
will elude the reach of the Policy because many cybersquat-
ters do not actively use the domain names in this manner.
Panel decisions reveal some degree of inconsistency re-
garding the quantum of use required by the Policy. The issue
was addressed in World Wrestling Federation, Inc. v. Bos-
man,17 the very first case decided under the Policy. In that
decision, the panel held that the offer to sell the domain name
registration to the complainant for a profit was a sufficient
"use" of the domain name to satisfy the Policy."
The panel in Telstra Corp. v. Nuclear Marshmallows
went a step further and decided that inactive use satisfied the
"use" requirement . In that case the complainant's trade-
mark was strong and the respondent attempted to conceal its
identity, thus the panel reasoned that the respondent's activi-
ties were inconsistent with a good faith use of the domain
name. Many panelists have followed this broad notion of
"use," especially if the complainant's trademark is strong and
well-known." In fact, these decisions call into question
whether a substantive use requirement exists at all.
However, other decisions construe the use requirement
87. World Wrestling Fed'n, Inc. v. Bosman, WIPO Case No. D1999-0001
(Jan. 4, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/1999/d1999-0001.html.
88. Other panels have found that simply a statement that the domains are
for sale, without mention of a price, nevertheless constitutes an offer for sale.
See Vartec Telecom, Inc. v. Jom Olenbush, WIPO Case No. D2000-1092 (Sept.
28, 2000), available at http'//arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-1092.html; Fed. Cartridge Co. v. Madmouse Communications,
WIPO Case No. D2001-0756 at 5 (July 24, 2001), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.intldomains/decisions/html/2001/d200l-O7 56 .html.
89. See Telstra Corp. v. Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO Case No. D2000-
0003 (Feb. 18, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/
decisions/html/2000/d2000-0003.html.
90. Another panel found use in bad faith "based on warehousing of the
[diomain names" alone "and no showing of any permitted actual use." See Fed-
eral Cartridge, D2001-0756 at 6.
91. For other decisions following this liberal construction of the use re-
quirement, see Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA v. David Sallen, WIPO Case
No. D2000-0461 (July 17, 2000), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d200 0 -O4 6 1.html; Bellvue
Square Mangers, Inc. v. Redmond Web, WIPO Case No. D2000-0056 (Mar. 27,
2000), available at httpJ/arbiter.wipo.inttdomains/decisionshtml 20 0 0/d 20 0 0 -
0056.html; Cellular One Group v. Paul Brien, WIPO Case No. D2000-0028
(Mar. 10, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/
decisions/html/2000/d2000-0028.html.
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more strictly, requiring something more than merely a suspi-
cious registration. For example, the panelist in Cyro Indus-
tries v. Contemporary Design held that because the respon-
dent never posted a web site at the domain name
<acrylite.com> and never contacted the complainant, it did
not use the domain name as the Policy requires.92 Likewise,
the panel in Sporoptic Pouilloux S.A. v. William H. Wilson re-
fused to transfer the domain name <buyvaurnetsun-
glasses.com> because no evidence indicated that the respon-
dent did anything other than register the domain name in
bad faith.93 The panel stated "absent a change in the Policy,
these cases of registration in bad faith by cybersquatters,
without any form of 'use' in any sense of the word, however
deplorable, do not fall under the Policy."94
To summarize, if the web site reached by using the regis-
trant's domain name has any display, or if the domain name
owner makes any attempt to sell the name at a profit, then
the use requirement probably will be met. Absent such ac-
tivity, a panel may find the use requirement lacking. How-
ever, if the trademark at issue is particularly strong and well-
known, a distinct possibility exists that a panelist will over-
look the use requirement and order the transfer of the name.
Assuming the use requirement is met, the complainant
still must demonstrate the respondent's bad faith.95 The Pol-
icy provides four specific circumstances that satisfy this ele-
ment:
(i) circumstances indicating that [the holder has] regis-
tered or [has] acquired the domain name primarily for the
purpose of selling, renting or otherwise transferring the
domain name registration to the complainant who is the
owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor
of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of
[the holder's] out-of-pocket costs directly related to the
domain name; or
92. Cyro Indus. v. Contemporary Design, WIPO Case No. D2000-0336 (June
19, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-0336.html.
93. Sporoptic Pouilloux S.A. v. Wilson, WIPO Case No. D2000-0265 (June
16, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/
2000/d2000-0265.html.
94. Id. 7.
95. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 1 4(a)(iii).
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(ii) [the holder has] registered the domain name in order
to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark
from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name,
provided that [the holder has] engaged in a pattern of
such conduct; or
(iii) [the holder has] registered the domain name primarily
for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor;
or
(iv) by using the domain name, [the holder has] intention-
ally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet
users to [its] web site or other online location, by creating
a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as
to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of
[the holder's] web site or location or of a product or service
on [the holder's] website or location.96
Numerous panel decisions address and give further ex-
plication to each of these indicia of bad faith.
1. Primary Purpose to Sell the Name
A review of the published panel decisions suggests that
the panels have adopted a rather low threshold for estab-
lishing a primary intent to sell the name to a trademark
owner or a competitor. This reading presumably is due in
part to the reality that if the complainant has shown that the
domain name is confusingly similar to its trademark, and
that the respondent has no legitimate interests in the name,
then a panel can infer "bad faith." For example, in Home In-
teriors & Gifts, Inc. v. Home Interiors, the panel found that
the posting of a counter displaying web page hits at the web
sites <homeinteriors.net> and <homeinteriorsandgifts.com>
was enough to show an intent to sell, because the counter il-
lustrated the number of diverted web users, and thus sup-
ported the cybersquatter's price.97 Likewise, the panel in
Educational Testing Service v. TOEFL concluded that proof of
a general intent to sell the website <toefl.com> to any buyer,
96. ICANN Policy, supra note 10, $ (4)(b). The Policy sets forth the ele-
ments out in second person, addressing the registrants of domain names more
directly in an apparent effort to give clear notice that their registrations are
subject to the terms of the Policy.
97. See Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. v. Home Interiors, WIPO Case No.
D2000-0010 (Mar. 7, 2000), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/htm/2000/d2OOO-OOlO.html.
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as contrasted with an intent to sell the domain name to the
trademark owner or its competitor, was enough to show bad
faith.98 Establishing the first two elements of the Policy's
three-prong test obviously impacts the panel's assessment of
the bad faith element: if the mark and the domain name are
similar, and especially if the marks are strong, and the re-
spondent does not have legitimate rights in the name, then it
is often only a short leap for the panel to conclude that the re-
spondent registered the domain name for the purpose of
making a profit. It is tempting for the panel to assume there
could be no other reason for registering such a domain name
if the name is not a commonly used term. Of course, if a re-
spondent had a legitimate interest in the name when it was
registered, it would not be bad faith for the party later to
agree to sell it for an amount in excess of its cost of procure-
ment, to compensate for any loss of good will to the regis-
trant.
2. Pattern of Bad Faith Registration
A panel can also find bad faith if a respondent engages in
a pattern of infringing registrations.99 This prong is aimed at
the stereotypical cybersquatter who has registered numerous
domain names incorporating well-known trademarks. °
While a serious cybersquatter may have hundreds of registra-
tions, and thus quite clearly has engaged in a prohibited pat-
tern, the more difficult question arises when the respondent
has registered only a few suspect domain names. The panels
have been somewhat inconsistent as to how many suspicious
registrations are sufficient to constitute bad faith: one case
found that two or three registrations were not enough, 101
98. See Educ. Testing Serv. v. TOEFL, WIPO Case No. D2000-0044 (Mar.
16, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisions/
htmI/2000/d2000-0044.html.
99. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 1 4(b)(ii).
100. A search at Network Solution's WHOIS website is one easy way to de-
termine the first fifty domain name registrations a person, or entity, may own,
provided that such registrations are with Network Solutions. However, it is
more difficult to search for registrations in this fashion if the registrant's do-
main names have been obtained through a different registrar. There are ongo-
ing debates within ICANN concerning the functionality and searchability of the
WHOIS database, and whether information in the WHOIS database should be
more readily available.
101. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Gully, WIPO Case No. D2000-0021 (Mar. 9,
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while another found three to be enough. °2 As these cases
demonstrate, while no magic number constitutes a pattern, if
a respondent has substantially more than three dubious reg-
istrations, a pattern is likely to be found, especially if the
registrations contain well-known trademarks. Other factors
which may also suggest a pattern include the following: (1)
whether the respondent has given bogus contact information
in its domain name registration; (2) whether the respondent
has failed to respond to the complaint; and (3) the degree of
similarity between the respondents' names and the estab-
lished trademarks.
3. Registration Primarily to Disrupt a Competitor's
Business
The panels have had little difficulty finding bad faith if
someone registers a mark primarily to deny a competitor use
of a mark on the Internet.' For example, in Georgia Gulf
Corp. v. The Ross Group, an officer of Roscom, Inc. registered
domain names nearly identical to the trade names of
Roscom's competitors, Bayshore Vinyl, Hoffman Plastics, and
the complainant, Georgia Gulf.' The respondent's <geor-
giagulf.com> website simply displayed a notice that the site
had been reserved and gave contact information.' After re-
spondent was served with Georgia Gulfs complaint, the re-
spondent sent an e-mail to the complainant offering to sell
the site for $36,000.'09 The panel concluded that respondent
"registered the domain name to prevent complainant from re-
flecting the mark in a corresponding domain name and...
primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a com-
petitor." 7
This prong of the Policy may also apply to disgruntled
2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisions/html/2000/d 20 0 0 -
0021.html.
102. See Bellevue Square Managers, Inc. v. Web, WIPO Case No. D2000-0056
(Mar. 27, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-0056.html.
103. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 4(b)(iii).
104. Georgia Gulf Corp. v. The Ross Group, WIPO Case No. D2000-0218
(June 14, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-0218.html.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. 3.
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employees who register the names of their employers. For
example, in Arab Bank for Investment & Foreign Trade v.
Sabah Mahmoud Akkou, the panel found bad faith registra-
tion where an employee registered the domain names <ar-
bift.org> and <arbift.net> while working for the complain-
ant."'8  The panel found that the registrant had been
employed for seventeen years by the complainant and was
"fully aware" of the complainant's trademark rights in the
name ARBIFT. Furthermore, the panel took note of respon-
dent's admission that there were "unclear past grudges" that
respondent bore towards the complainant."9 In a similar
case, Cook Motorcars v. Patricia Soto, the panel held that an
employee who registered the domain name <motorcar-
scook.com> while on the job acted in bad faith."'
4. Creating Confusion for Commercial Gain
This prong of the Policy applies when the respondent
creates confusion between the domain name and a trademark
to attract users to its website, and most closely resembles
traditional trademark infringement. For example, in British
Broadcasting Corp. v. Renteria, the respondent, an individual
in Caracas, Venezuela, registered the domain names <bbcde-
londres.com>, <bbcenespanol.com>, <bbcenespanol.net>, and
<bbcenespanol.org>."1 At one of these sites, the respondent
used the BBC's logo, framed the content of its website, and
described itself as being a "world leader in news" offering "up
to date, accurate and independent information 24 hours a
day."" 2 The panel concluded that such conduct constituted an
intentional attempt to attract web users for commercial gain
by creating confusion as to source, sponsorship, or affilia-
108. See Arab Bank for Inv. & Foreign Trade v. Sabah Mahmound Akkou,
WIPO Case No. D2000-1399 at 6B3 (Dec. 19, 2000) ("The effect of this ware-
housing is to prevent the Complainant [employer] from reflecting this trade-
mark in a corresponding domain name"), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisionsthtml/2000/d2000.399.html.
109. Id.
110. See Cook Motorcars Ltd. v. Soto, NAF No. FA0006000094992 (July 18,
2000), available at www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/94992.htm.
111. British Broad. Corp. v. Renteria, WIPO Case No. D2000-0050 (Mar. 23,
2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000.
0050.html.
112. Id. T 4.
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tion.
113
In addition to the four types of bad faith acts outlined in
the Policy, panels are empowered to find bad faith in addi-
tional ways as they see fit. A combination of negative factors
may be enough to convince a panel to find bad faith. For ex-
ample, in Home Interiors & Gifts, the panel found that Inter-
net users "entering 'www.homeinteriorsandgifts.com' are
more likely than not expecting to arrive at a web site hosted
by complainant. '".4 In addition, the panel seemed moved by
the fact that only a counter existed at the website, which it
described as "tantamount to an advertisement that the web
site is for sale and is an indicator of its value.""5 Although
the complainant never established the specific indicators of
bad faith, the panel granted a transfer of the name. Another
example is Tourism & Corporate Automation Ltd. v. TSI
Ltd,16 in which a disgruntled employee left his job then regis-
tered a domain name identical to his former employer's mark,
<tourplan.com>, and was unable to show a genuine intent to
use the name legitimately. Finally, failing to respond to a
complaint appears to increase the chances that the panel will
find the respondent acted in bad faith.
In sum, under the ICANN system, domain names should
only be transferred under the Policy if the owner of the regis-
tered term has no legitimate interests in the domain name,
and if the holder obtained the domain name in bad faith, for
either the purposes of selling it for a profit or for injuring its
competitors' business. Good faith domain name registrations
that create a likelihood of confusion or result in trademark
dilution should not be transferred in an ICANN approved
proceeding. Thus, unless evidence exists of bad faith on the
part of the holder, the ICANN dispute resolution system will
not vindicate trademark rights. In practice, much turns on
what kind of proof is available to establish "bad faith." Be-
cause no effective discovery mechanism exists, a complainant
113. See id. 6.
114. Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. v. Home Interiors, WIPO Case No. D2000-
0010, 5 (Mar. 7, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
htmV2000/d2000-0010.html.
115. Id.
116. Tourism & Corporate Automation Ltd. v. TSI Ltd., AF-0096 (eResolu-
tion, Mar. 6, 2000), at http://www.eresolution.com/services/dnd/
decisions/0096.htm.
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often will have to demonstrate bad faith with publicly avail-
able information, or proof of extortionary communications
made by the respondent.
Finally, participants in ICANN proceedings should know
that decisions rendered under this system may be appealed."7
For complainants, a failed attempt to have a domain name
transferred through the quicker and potentially less expen-
sive ICANN system can be followed by an attempt to vindi-
cate broader trademark rights in court with an infringement
or dilution theory. Of course, the losing complainant runs the
risk that, on appeal, a judge will give some deference to the
opinion of the "experts." One court addressing this issue
stated that it was not bound by the ICANN decision, but de-
clined to announce a specific standard of review to apply.'18
However, in such a situation, the complainant may "poison
the well" by allowing the defendant in a court proceeding to
call attention to its initial victory, even if the court is techni-
cally not bound by the prior opinion.
An ICANN decision is not the "final word" for complain-
ants, even if they prevail. Respondents unhappy with an
ICANN result can suspend the transfer of a contested domain
name by filing an action in a district court and providing no-
tice to their registrar within ten days of the adverse ICANN
ruling."9 Nothing in the Policy appears to bar respondents
that miss this deadline from later filing suit in court. How-
ever, the respondent will lose possession of the domain name
unless and until it obtains a court victory or settlement. For
example, in Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., the court ruled that
restrictions in the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA") re-
garding judicial review of arbitration awards were not appli-
cable to administrative proceedings under the ICANN Pol-
117. Paragraph 4(k) of the ICANN Policy, supra note 10, states that the
mandatory administrative proceeding requirements "shall not prevent either
you [the respondent] or the complainant from submitting the dispute to a court
of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before such mandatory ad-
ministrative proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding is concluded."
118. See Weber-Stephen Prods. Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply,
Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1766 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
119. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 4(k) ("If an Administrative Panel
decided that [respondent] domain name registration should be canceled or
transferred, we will wait ten (10) business days (as observed in the location of
our principal office) after we are informed by the applicable Provider of the Ad-
ministrative Panel's decision before implementing the decision.").
[Vol.42
20011 TRADEMARKS AND DOMAIN NAMES 87
icy. ° In that case, the respondent lost in the UDRP pro-
ceeding and filed an action for declaratory judgment in fed-
eral court.12 ' The complainant/defendant filed a motion to
dismiss based solely on the FAA, arguing that the plaintiff
failed to assert grounds cognizable under the FAA for setting
aside an arbitration.'22 The court rejected the defendant's mo-
tion, holding that according to the UDRP's own terms, the re-
sults are not binding for either party: "Nothing in the UDRP
restrains either party from filing suit before, after, or during
the administrative hearing." 3
Thus, the only real effect the ICANN proceeding has is to
transfer possession and control of the domain name, since the
parties' legal rights to the domain name are not affected by
the outcome of the proceeding. Few bad faith cybersquatters,
however, will likely file in court to recapture their registra-
tions due to the prohibitive costs of litigation at that level.
III. THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
("ACPA" or the "Act") was passed in 1999 as an addition to
the Lanham Act.' 4 Like the ICANN dispute resolution
mechanism, the ACPA was created to prevent people from
registering others' marks as domain names in an attempt to
extract money from them, or to injure them commercially.'
A. Jurisdictional Issues
The ACPA has two jurisdictional bases, personal and in
rem. For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction, the
state's long-arm statute must reach the defendant's alleged
conduct, and the defendant must have "minimum contacts"
with the forum state.' 27 In determining whether personal ju-
120. Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E. D. Va. 2001).
121. See id. at 748.
122. Id. at 749.
123. Id. at 751.
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2001).
125. Id.
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A), (2)(A).
127. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); GTE New Media
Serv., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that a
passive website did not support jurisdiction under the long arm statute, or due
process).
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risdiction exists based on a defendant's website, courts typi-
cally look to the type of activity on the website.28 If the de-
fendant's website is passive, in that it simply provides infor-
mation but cannot receive information or enable a
transaction, then the mere availability of the website in a
particular location will not necessarily form the basis for per-
sonal jurisdiction in that location.'29 On the other hand, if the
[diefendant's website is interactive," in that it encourages
visitors to provide information or consummate a commercial
transaction, then a court will probably find personal jurisdic-
tion in any forum where such interaction takes place. 3 ° The
level of interactivity of a web site reflects whether the owner
has purposely availed itself of the privileges of the forum
state to warrant a finding of personal jurisdiction.'
Many cybersquatters, however, do not bother displaying
a website at the domain names they have registered. In these
cases, if the defendant "reached out" to the forum state by of-
fering to sell domain names to a resident of the forum state,
then the Due Process Clause should be satisfied, because the
conduct at issue is aimed at having an effect in the forum
state.1 32 However, merely registering a domain name, without
128. See Mink v. A.A.A.A. Dev. L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); Cyber-
sell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997).
129. See Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1299
(10th Cir. 1999) ("'[Mlaintenance of a passive website, merely providing informa-
tion to interested viewers, [does not] constitute the kind of purposeful availment
of the benefits of doing business in Utah, such that [the defendant] could expect
to be haled into court in that state." ); GTE New Media, 199 F.3d at 1349 (com-
paring access to a passive website as "nothing more than a telephone call by a
District resident to the defendant's computer servers .... ); Bensusan Rest.
Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
130. See Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 724, 728-
29 (W.D. Mich. 2000); Tech Heads, Inc. v. Desktop Serv. Ctr., Inc., 105 F. Supp.
2d 1142 (D. Or. 2000); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119,
1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Sports Auth. Michigan, Inc. v. Justballs, Inc., 97 F. Supp.
2d 806, 813 (E.D. Mich. 2000) ("It is clear that the ability to download, transmit
or exchange information with a defendant via the computer and the presence of
on-line contracts between a defendant and a plaintiff are sufficient for a court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant.").
131. See Justballs, 97 F. Supp. at 813.
132. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir.
1998) ("simply registering someone else's trademark as a domain name and
posting a web site on the Internet is not sufficient to subject a party domiciled
in one state to a jurisdiction in another."). But a defendant who "engaged in a
scheme to register trademarks as his domain names for the purpose of extorting
money from [plaintifli" is subject to personal jurisdiction. Id.
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more, does not automatically subject the registrant to juris-
diction in the forum of a plaintiffs choosing. For example, in
one case, America Online attempted to sue a cybersquatter in
the Eastern District of Virginia, where the cybersquatter's
registrar (Network Solutions) was located. 33 The court found
that the mere act of registering a name with a registrar in a
particular jurisdiction did not subject the registrant to juris-
diction in that locale.'
The in rem action under the ACPA is thus a necessary
addition to properly combat cybersquatting because domain
name registrants can be located anywhere in the world, and
many are not subject to personal jurisdiction in the United
States.' The Act allows a plaintiff to bring an in rem action
to be brought "in the judicial district in which the domain
name register, registry, or other domain name authority that
registered or assigned the domain name is located."'36 Thus,
it allows a plaintiff to reach cybersquatters who reside out-
side of the United States and register domain names with
registrars in the United States.
The in rem procedure is useful, but contains an impor-
tant limitation: it only can be used to transfer the domain
name and cannot be used as the sole jurisdictional basis to
pursue a cause of action that might result in personal liabil-
ity.'37 Thus, claims of trademark infringement, dilution, and
unfair competition cannot be asserted in an in rem action.'38
In order to institute an in rem action under the Act, the
plaintiff must show either that the plaintiff was unable to ob-
tain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, or that the
133. America Online v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848 (E.D. Va. 2000).
134. Id. at 856.
135. Prior to passage of the ACPA, in rem proceedings were unavailable un-
der the Lanham Act. In one widely discussed, pre-ACPA case, Porsche at-
tempted to bring an in rem action against dozens of unauthorized domain
names incorporating Porsche's marks. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsch.com,
51 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Va. 1999). The court rejected Porsche's efforts, ruling
that the Lanham Act, at that time, only contemplated in personam relief.
136. 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(2)(A); see also, FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. FleetBoston-
financial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. Mass. 2001) (dismissing in rem claim
filed in Boston because the domain name was registered with Network Solu-
tions, which is located in Herndon, Virginia).
137. See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110 F. Supp. 2d 420
(E.D. Va. 2000) (dismissing plaintiffs trademark infringement, dilution, and
unfair competition claims).
138. See id.
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plaintiff, after due diligence, could not find the domain name
registrant. 9 Thus, personal and in rem jurisdictions under
the Act are mutually exclusive.' 4° One court, Heathmount A.E.
Corp. v. Technodome.com, noted that plaintiffs could be too
quick to conclude that personal jurisdiction is lacking, and
thus required the plaintiff to demonstrate "some indicia of
due diligence in trying to establish personal jurisdiction over
an individual who has been identified as a potential defen-
dant but is not subject to jurisdiction."' The court found that
a domain name registrant living in Canada, whose only con-
tact with Virginia was the act of registering the domain on-
line, was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Virginia; thus
the plaintiff could proceed with the in rem action. 4' Accord-
ingly, if the plaintiff can identify the domain name owner,
then he or she bears the burden of proving that personal ju-
risdiction does not exist before obtaining in rem jurisdiction
over the domain name itself.
If the plaintiff cannot identify the domain name regis-
trant, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it exercised due
diligence in attempting to identify the registrant before filing
an in rem action.'4' The ACPA provides that where a plaintiff
(a) sends the registrant notice of the alleged violation to the
postal and e-mail addresses listed in the registration, (b) in-
forms the registrant of the plaintiffs intent to proceed under
the Act, and (c) publishes notice of the lawsuit as directed by
the court, such actions constitute due diligence.' The plain-
tiff must also give the registrant sufficient time to respond to
its notices before proceeding with the in rem action. For in-
stance, in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, the
court held that filing an in rem action only eight days after
the second demand letter was mailed and e-mailed was an in-
sufficient waiting period to constitute "due diligence," and
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
140. See Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.com, 128 F.
Supp. 2d 340 (E. D. Va. 2001) ("A mark owner may proceed either in personam
against an infringer or, in certain circumstances where this cannot be done, the
owner may proceed in rem against the domain name; a mark owner may not
proceed against both at the same time").
141. Heathmount A. E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D.
Va. 2000).
142. See id.
143. See 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
144. Id.
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violated the Due Process Clause.'45 The court did not state a
definitive rule as to how much time was sufficient, but im-
plied that twenty days is probably enough time, and that less
than ten days is certainly too little.'46
The ACPA provides that service under the in rem section
can be effected by satisfying the due diligence requirements,
i.e., by sending a notice to the registrant by postal mail and e-
mail, and publishing notice as the court may require.147 In
Banco Inverlat v. www.inverlat.com, the Eastern District of
Virginia held that the publication requirement is discretion-
ary, and can be waived by the court.'48 The court found that
where the registrant has had actual knowledge of the suit,
ordering a publication would be useless. 9 However, in Shri
Ram Chandra Mission v. Sahajmarg.org, the same district
court distinguished Banco Inverlat, and held that publication
is not discretionary. 0 Rather, the Court held that only the
manner of publication is within the court's discretion."' The
Shri Ram court distinguished Banco Inverlat based on the
fact that in Banco Inverlat, the registrant had actual notice of
the suit, unlike the registrant in Shri Ram."' Accordingly, if
a plaintiff can establish that the registrant has actual notice
of the suit, it has a stronger chance of having the publication
requirement waived."'
Due in part to its peculiar requirements for serving de-
fendants under the in rem clause, the ACPA creates some
doubt as to when the registrant has defaulted for failure to
answer the complaint in time. As discussed above, the ACPA
requires a plaintiff to send a notice of its intent to proceed be-
fore it can file an in rem complaint."4 And before plaintiffs
145. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 532 (E.D.
Va. 2000).
146. See id. at 553-54.
147. See 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(2)(B).
148. See Banco Inverlat v. www.inverlat.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D. Va.
2000).
149. See id. at 523.
150. Shri Ram Chandra Mission v. Sanajmarg.org, 139 F. Supp. 2d 721, 723
(E. D. Va. 2001).
151. Id. ("The discretion afforded by the statute to a district court is merely
over the manner in which notice may be published (e.g., where notice is pub-
lished, how often, etc.)").
152. Id. at n.3.
153. See Banco Inverlat, 112 F. Supp. 2d 521.
154. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
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can file a complaint, the courts require them to give defen-
dants sufficient time to respond, and have suggested that
they wait twenty days.
55
Typically, the plaintiff serves the complaint on the defen-
dant. The statute states that the due diligence requirement
(that must be made before filing) constitutes service of the
complaint.'56 Thus, once the Plaintiff has discharged its due
diligence requirement (both in terms of sending its notice of
intent to proceed and waiting for a response), it has effec-
tively served the defendant the complaint. A question then
arises as to when the defendant has defaulted for failure to
file a timely answer. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(a), the defendant must answer within twenty days from
receipt of service.' 7 Because the courts have suggested that
plaintiffs should wait at least twenty days after sending the
intent to proceed before filing, the defendant would be in de-
fault on the very day the in rem complaint was filed (or poten-
tially some time before the complaint is filed, if the plaintiff
waits longer than twenty days to file).
Where the defendant received actual notice, at least one
court maintained the twenty day deadline.58 But it is un-
clear, however, whether a court would enter a default where
there has been no response from the defendant, such as when
the postal mail is returned "unclaimed" and the defendant
does not respond to the e-mail (common facts in domain name
disputes).
Because the idea of a default being issued before the
complaint has been filed is so uncommon in our legal system
(and may be susceptible to being deemed unconstitutional),
plaintiffs should either send another letter to the registrant
after the complaint has been filed and wait twenty days from
that date, or move the court to order the registrant to appear
or plead. Where the courts have been asked to order the reg-
155. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 532
(E.D. Va. 2000).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(B).
157. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A) ("Unless a different time is prescribed in a
statute of the United States, a defendant shall serve an answer within 20 days
after being served. . ."). Also, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(n) provides as
follows, "If a statute of the United States so provides, the court may assert ju-
risdiction over property. Notice to claimants of the property shall be sent in the
manner provided by the statute, or by service of a summons under this rule."
158. Heathmount, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 868.
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istrants to appear or plead, they have given them twenty days
to do so, but in each case, the defendants had received actual
notice of the proceeding.'59 It remains to be seen whether a
court would condone a default based solely on a failure to re-
spond to a notice of intent to proceed.
B. Substantive Considerations in ACPA Actions
To prevail on the merits under the ACPA, the plaintiff
must show the following: (1) that its mark is either distinctive
or famous; (2) the defendant's domain name is "identical or
confusingly similar" to plaintiffs mark, or dilutive of its fa-
mous mark; and (3) the defendant acted with a bad faith in-
tent to profit from the plaintiffs mark.6 9 One interesting dif-
ference between these elements and the elements under the
ICANN Policy is that the ACPA prohibits domain names that
are "dilutive" of a famous mark. The term "dilutive" broadens
the field of potentially infringing domain names to include not
only confusingly similar names, but also those that weaken
the selling power of the famous mark.' At least one appel-
late court has specifically adopted the criteria for determining
fame set forth in the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.
162
The protection against trademark dilution in this context
may encompass "[trademark] sucks" registrations, which
have not consistently been deemed confusingly similar."' In
Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Johnson, the plaintiff stated a
claim under the ACPA where the defendant's <lucent-
sucks.com> domain allegedly displayed pornography.' The
court determined that a such an association could "corrode
the positive associations of the plaintiffs mark, thereby re-
159. Id. at 868; see also Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com, 1.12 F.
Supp. 2d 505 (E.D. Va. 2000) (applying the established in rem concepts found in
admiralty and civil forfeiture proceedings to the ACPA).
160. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497
(2d Cir. 2000); Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 157 F. Supp. 2d
658, 668 (E. D. Va. 2001).
161. Compare with ICANN Policy 4(a)(i) (the standard is "identical or con-
fusingly similar" to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has
rights").
162. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497.
163. See supra note 145.
164. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Johnson, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1637 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
But see Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (E.D.
Va. 2000) (suggesting that use of "sucks" in domain name would not, in and of
itself, be actionable).
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ducing its value," which is actionable under a dilution the-165
ory.
Another facial difference between the ACPA and the
ICANN Policy is the former's explicit inclusion of rights of
publicity.'66 The statute includes "a personal name," whereas
the ICANN Policy only includes trademarks and service
marks.67 While several ICANN decisions have transferred
domain names based on rights of publicity, a panel could read
the language of the Policy more narrowly.' To date, no re-
ported decisions involve application of the ACPA to publicity
rights.
Like the ICANN dispute resolution system, the central
issue under the ACPA is the defendant's bad faith. 9 The Act
sets forth a list of factors the courts may consider in deter-
mining whether a registration is actionable:
(1) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of
the person, if any, in the domain name;
(2) the extent to which the domain name consists of the
legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise
commonly used to identify that person;
(3) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in
connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or
services;
(4) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the
mark in a site accessible under the domain name;
(5) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark
owner's online location to a site accessible under the do-
165. Id. at 1638.
166. 15 U.S.C. 1125(d)(1)(A) ("A person shall be liable in a civil action by the
owner of a mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark under
this section").
167. ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 9 4(a)(i) (respondent's "domain name is
identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the
complainant has rights") (emphasis added).
168. Indeed, at least one such panelist has done so. See Bruce Springsteen v.
Jeff Berger, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532 (Jan. 25, 2001), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-1532.html.
169. The ACPA has been interpreted to require a showing of bad faith in both
in personam and in rem proceedings, before the domain name registration can
be transferred, despite the concern that it may be difficult for plaintiffs to show
bad faith in an in rem proceeding since the defendant most likely will be absent.
See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 2000 WL 1175103 *7 (E.D.
Va. 2000).
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main name that could harm the goodwill represented by
the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to
tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or en-
dorsement of the site;
(6) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign
the domain name to the mark owner or any third party for
financial gain without having used, or having an intent to
use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any
goods and services, or the person's prior conduct indicat-
ing a pattern of such conduct;
(7) the person's provision of material and misleading false
contact information when applying for the registration of
the domain name, the person's intentional failure to main-
tain accurate contact information, or the person's prior
conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(8) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple do-
main names which the person knows are identical or con-
fusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive at
the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive
of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of
registration of such domain names, without regard to the
goods or services of the parties; and
(9) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the per-
son's domain name registration is or is not distinctive and
famous within the meaning of the list of factors for deter-
mining fame under subsection 43(c)(1) of section 43.
(ii) Bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A)
shall not be found in any case in which the court deter-
mines that the person believed and had reasonable
grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a
fair use or otherwise lawful.
170
While these factors are similar to the bad faith factors
found in the ICANN system, two important differences exist.
The most significant is the absence of any requirement that
the domain name registrant actually use the domain name.
As discussed above, the ICANN Policy states that the com-
plainant must show that the registration "has been registered
and is being used in bad faith.' 7 ' By contrast, the ACPA im-
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B).
171. See ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 4(a)(iii).
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poses liability on any person who "registers, traffics in, or
uses a domain name" in bad faith.172 While ICANN panels
generally construe the use requirement to be easily satisfied,
some do not.'73 Due to this uncertainty, if the registrant's
domain name is not being used, i.e., it is "under construction,"
or simply inactive, the ACPA's broader reach should be a fac-
tor to consider when determining which legal mechanism to
employ. Because many cybersquatters register hundreds of
names and never use them, the ACPA's broad reach is a truly
significant feature.
The other difference is the treatment of the fair use de-
fense. While the ACPA does not specifically articulate a fair
use defense, "the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use
of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name" is a
factor to be considered by the judge in determining bad
faith. 17 4 In addition, the statute provides a safe harbor for
registrants that reasonably believe their use is fair. 7 5 Fair
use under the ACPA is articulated less clearly than the fair
use defense set forth in the ICANN Policy, most likely be-
cause the ACPA's drafters were relying on the judiciary's set-
tled First Amendment principles.' The ICANN Policy's fair
use defense is, by contrast, more specific.'77 Registrants are
172. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
173. See supra note 6.
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B).
175. Id. At least one court has limited the safe harbor provision to some de-
gree. In Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., the court held that a defen-
dant "who acts even partially in bad faith in registering a domain name is not,
as a matter of law, entitled to benefit from the safe harbor provision." 238 F.3d
264, 270 (4th Cir. 2001).
176. The extent of the First Amendment's influence on domain name dis-
putes is still largely undetermined. In Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions,
Inc., 202 F.3d 573 (2nd Cir. 2000), the court stated in dicta that "there is noth-
ing inherent in the architecture of the Internet that prevents new gTLDs from
constituting expressive speech ... the functionality of domain names does not
automatically place them beyond the reach of the First Amendment." Id. at 585(finding that three letter gTLDs, such as <.com>, <.net>, and <.org.> were not
expressive speech, but rejecting the notion that alphanumeric addresses are
merely source identifiers rather than communicative messages as being too
monolithic). However, in the case of most domain name disputes between pri-
vate parties that are resolved by private arbitrators under the ICANN system,
the "state" action requirement appears to be conspicuously lacking. See Nat'l A-
1 Adver., Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. N.H. 2000)(finding Network Solutions was not a state actor such that its denial of a do-
main name application did not violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights).
177. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV).
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required to represent that "[they] are making a legitimate
noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent
for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to
tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue." '178 While this
language could be construed generously, it is susceptible to a
narrow construction that would, for example, deny a fair use
defense where the domain name tarnished the trademark
179
owner.
Another reason courts are likely to be more "speech con-
scious" than the private ICANN panels is that as instrumen-
talities of the state applying legislation, a court's transfer of
property (a domain name registration) may be considered suf-
ficient state action to trigger constitutional restraints 8 ° By
contrast, the private ICANN panels may be less apt to feel
bound by the First Amendment, and will simply look to the
language of the Policy that has been incorporated into the
registration contract. Due to constitutional concerns and
broader statutory language, courts are more likely to classify
a domain name holder's activities as protected speech. For
example, in Northland Insurance Cos. v. Blaylock, Patrick
Blaylock, the domain name holder, registered <northlandin-
surance.com> to voice his criticisms of the plaintiffs business
practices after an insurance coverage dispute arose.' The
plaintiff charged Blaylock with trademark infringement,
trademark dilution, and cybersquatting under the ACPA, and
moved for a preliminary injunction."' The court denied the
preliminary injunction on all three claims."' Regarding the
cybersquatting claim, the court found that the defendant's
domain name was noncommercial use, stating, "[W]hile the
defendant admits he intends to attract Internet users inter-
ested in plaintiffs business, the record does not reflect that he
178. ICANN Policy, supra note 10, 4(c).
179. See Mission KwaSizabantu v. Benjamin Rost, WIPO Case No. D2000-
0279 (June 7, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-0279.html; Hunton & Williams v. Am. Distribution Sys., Inc.,
WIPO Case No. D2000-0501 (Aug. 1, 2000), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2OOO-O5Ol.html.
180. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
181. Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Minn. 2000)
182. Id. at 1114.
183. Id. at 1125.
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does so for commercial purposes."8 4
The courts generally use the nine indicia of bad faith
listed in the statute,185 but they have also considered other
factors, as the ACPA clearly contemplates. As one example,
in Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., the court
found bad faith even when the counterclaim defendant, owner
of the <sportys.com> domain name, did not seek to sell the
domain name back to the trademark owners.'86 The court
analyzed all nine factors, but was most moved by the "unique
circumstances" of the case,8 7 which included evidence that the
defendant's parent corporation knew of the plaintiffs
SPORTY'S trademark for aviation goods and services at the
time of registration, and was planning to go into direct com-
petition with it in these markets.'88 The court determined that
the defendant registered "for the primary purpose of keeping
Sportsman's from using that domain name."'89 The court did
not believe the counterclaim defendant's testimony that it
chose the name because of a dog named "Spotty," character-
izing such explanation as "more amusing than credible."9 '
In Shields v. Zuccarini, the plaintiff operated a popular
website at <www.joecartoon.com> which featured plaintiffs
184. Id. at 1124. There are, of course, cases where the federal courts have
not been particularly sensitive to First Amendment concerns. For instance, in
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir.
2001), the court rejected defendant's parody defense because the domain name
itself did not convey the contradictory messages simultaneously. Rather, the
court reasoned, the internet user would not realize that they were not at the of-
ficial PETA website until they entered it. Id. at 367. This ruling virtually re-
quires parody or "'cyber griper" websites to incorporate their message within the
domain name itself. This conclusion appears to be at odds with the line of cases
holding that initial interest confusion is not actionable unless the parties' goods
are somewhat competitive. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1056; Chatam Int'l v.
Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558 (E.D. Penn. 2001) ("Where companies are
non-competitors initial interest confusion does not have the same consequences
.... "1).
185. See Northland, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 n.8.
186. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262
(2000).
187. Id. at 499.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. Sporty's Farm was not actually formed until nine months after the
domain name was registered and did not begin its operations until after the
lawsuit was filed. See id. at 498. This court, like most of the others that have
addressed similar fact patterns, was not fooled by the defendant's attempts to
create the appearance of an innocent domain name registration. Id. at 489.
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humorous animations.' The defendant registered the do-
mains <joescartoon.com>, <joecarton.com>, <joescar-
tons.com>, and <cartoonjoe.com>, which featured advertise-
ments for other sites and credit card companies.'92 Visitors
who accidentally misspelled the Joe Cartoon web address
were "mousetrapped" in the defendant's site, prevented from
easily exiting by a succession of ads that came up on the
'93
screen.
The same day the suit was filed, the defendant changed
the site's contents to a protest against the content of Joe Car-
toon animations.'94 The court easily concluded that the de-
fendant registered with the required bad faith: he had no
bona fide intellectual property rights to the name, the name
was not his personal name, and he admitted in court that he
registered thousands of names and their misspellings in an
effort to divert Internet traffic to his sites.9 The defendant
argued that he was entitled to prevail on a fair use defense
because he reasonably believed that his use was lawful and
proper political speech.9 The court was not convinced, find-
ing that the timing of his conversion to protest, combined
with the fact that 99% of his other domain names were com-
mercial in nature, undermined his claimed intentions.'97
Ultimately, the Shields court found for the plaintiff, and
awarded him statutory damages of $50,000 ($10,000 for each
infringing domain name), attorney's fees of $35,798.50, and
costs of $3,310.96.9' The ACPA allows plaintiffs to elect ei-
191. Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634 (E.D. Pa. 2000), affd, 254 F.3d
476 (3d Cir. 2001). On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected defendants' argument
that the ACPA was not meant to prevent intentional misspellings, also known
as "typosquatting." Id. at 483.
192. Id. at 635.
193. Id.
194. Id. Joe Cartoon's page featured the creation "Frog Blender" and "Micro-
Gerbil" which the defendant, in his self-proclaimed "Political Protest" page,
claimed encouraged children to mutilate animals.
195. Id. at 640.
196. Id.
197. Id. Mr. Zuccarini's arguments have been similarly unsuccessful in a va-
riety of other decisions, both under the ACPA and under the ICANN Policy.
See, e.g., Elec. Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (E.D.
Pa. 2000); Kidman v. Zuccarini, WIPO Case No. D2000-1415 (Jan. 23, 2001),
available at http://arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisions/htmV2000/d 200 0 -
1415.html.
198. Shields v. Zaccarini, No. CIV.A.00-494, 2000 WL 1053884 (E.D. Pa., July
18, 2000).
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ther actual or statutory damages,'99 which may amount to be-
tween $1,000 and $100,000 per infringing domain name.2"'
The defendant argued that the statutory damages provision
did not apply to his conduct because he registered the names
before the ACPA became effective. 21  The court rejected this
argument, reasoning that the defendant's use continued after
the effective date, thus justifying the stiffer remedies.0 2 The
availability of statutory damages and attorney's fees is a ma-
jor advantage of suing under the ACPA. Since professional
cybersquatting defendants often have hundreds or thousands
of illegitimate domain names, simply losing several of them in
a court ordered transfer does not seriously affect their opera-
tions. A case like Shields properly encourages and compen-
sates the plaintiff, and could act as a deterrent to future pi-
203
racy.
Cases such as Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence-Dahl
Cos., however, can discourage the plaintiff.24 In this case, the
owner of the trademark CELLO sued the domain registrant
of <cello.com>. The defendant had registered many domain
names, including <gotmilk.com>, <4nasdaq.com>, and
<thenyse.com>, advertised them for sale to the public, and of-
fered to sell the <cello.com> registration to at least nine dif-
ferent entities for $4,800.205 Such facts would typically sug-
gest bad faith; however, the judge in this case was cautious,
finding a disputed issue of fact on intent, due in part because
the defendant had registered common nouns and did not tar-
199. Statutory damages must be affirmatively elected. In Morrison & Foer-
ster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Colo. 2000), the court found, after a
full trial, that the defendant violated the ACPA, but refused to grant statutory
damages because while the plaintiff reserved the right to seek statutory dam-
ages in its complaint, it never actually elected the remedy. Id. at 1136.
200. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d).
201. Shields, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 640.
202. Shields, 2000 WL 1053884 at *1 n.1.
203. Courts interpreting the ACPA have evidenced a willingness to impose
significant statutory damages awards. In Elec. Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuc-
carini, 56 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1705 (E.D. Pa. 2000), the court awarded the plaintiff$500,000 in statutory damages, $100,000 for each of the five infringing domain
names registered by defendant Zuccarini. In another recent case, the Southern
District of Texas awarded a prevailing ACPA plaintiff $25,000 in statutory
damages. E & J Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (S.D.
Tex. 2001).
204. See Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence-Dahl Cos., 89 F. Supp. 2d 464
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
205. See id. at 467-68.
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get a specific company."' These facts, the court reasoned,
created an issue as to whether the defendant "had reasonable
grounds to believe that the use of <cello.com> was a 'fair use'
or 'otherwise lawful.' 2°7 In considering the motion for sum-
mary judgment, the court did not find bad faith on the part of
the defendant. This result was certainly a disappointment for
the plaintiff who was forced to either proceed with going to
trial to clear the domain name, or settle with the holder of the
name. Of course, this is the very dynamic that fuels the cy-
bersquatting industry.
IV. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND DILUTION
Before the ICANN system and the ACPA, trademark
owners generally relied on dilution statutes to avoid paying
cybersquatters' demands. One of the most well-known of
these cases is Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen. °8 In that case, the
defendant registered the domain names <panavision.com>
and <panaflex.com>, and then demanded $13,000 for the sale
of the domain names to the trademark owner.2"9 The defen-
dant was savvy enough to create the appearance of a good
faith registration by displaying a map of Pana, Illinois, at the
site, hence justifying its website as providing "Pana-vision."21 °
Ultimately the court saw through this charade and found for
the plaintiff. However, in reaching this equitable result, the
court had to stretch the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in
several ways, including creating a third type of dilution (in
addition to blurring and tarnishment),21' interpreting the at-
tempt to sell the domain name as "commercial use,"212 and
206. Id. at 474. The court also decided there was a factual issue as to
whether the mark CELLO was distinctive when applied to sound equipment.
This is a surprising result, since the plaintiff had owned a registration since
1995, and the term "cello" could hardly be said to describe high-end stereo
equipment. The court found that because there were approximately twenty
other registrations for CELLO, the presumption of distinctiveness could be
overcome. Id. at 473-74.
207. Id. at 474. See also Hartog & Co. v. Swix.net, 136 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E. D.
Va. 2001) (finding defendant's use of <swix.com> and <swix.net> was in good
faith where he was unaware of plaintiffs business before the dispute).
208. Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
209. Id. at 1318.
210. See id.
211. Id. at 1326.
212. Id. at 1325.
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construing the "famous mark" requirement liberally to afford
the protection sought.21 Even with these generous conces-
sions, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act could not remedy
the cybersquatting problem adequately, because many of the
potentially targeted marks would clearly not meet the fame
requirement. In response, Congress amended the Lanham
Act as discussed above.
Despite the new developments, dilution and infringement
actions still are potential weapons in domain name disputes.
If a defendant is using a domain name in a way that blurs or
tarnishes an owner's famous mark, yet evidence of bad faith
is scant, then the dilution claim may be the best choice. Also,
if competing online companies have a dispute over the rights
to confusingly similar trademarks and domain names, both
obtained in good faith, then the traditional trademark in-
fringement action would be most appropriate. These tradi-
tional claims have been successfully used together. Finally,
as with the ICANN proceedings and the ACPA, traditional in-
fringement and dilution claims do not generally reach non-
commercial use of a trademark, including use in a domain
name.214
As one example, in Northern Light Technology, Inc. v.
Northern Lights Club, the owner of the mark NORTHERN
LIGHT sued the holder of the domain name <northern-
lights.com> under both a cybersquatting theory and a trade-
mark infringement theory.25 The court held that there was a
likelihood of success on the merits on the infringement claim,
finding that the defendant's use of the domain name for a
search engine was similar to the plaintiffs search engine,
even though the scope of the navigation aids differed. 216 The
court also found that the channels of trade were identical,
both being on the Internet.1 7 As for the ACPA claim, the
213. Id. at 1327.
214. Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1121 (D. Minn.
2000).
215. N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D. Mass. 2000),
affd, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001). For other recent cases where traditional in-
fringement and/or dilution claims were used to combat confusingly similar
terms in domain names, see Cline v. 1-888-Plumbing Group, Inc., 146 F. Supp.
2d (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Transunion L.L.C. v. Credit Research, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d
1029 (E.D. Ill. 2001).
216. Northern Light Tech., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 110.
217. Id. at 111.
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court found the marks confusingly similar in a direct com-
parison, and it easily found bad faith where the defendant
also owned registrations for <rollingstones.com>, <yan-
keesl.com>, and many others.218
V. CONCLUSION
In the last two years, owners of trademarks were pro-
vided two new legal weapons in the fight against cybersquat-
ting - the ICANN dispute resolution system and the Anticy-
bersquatting Consumer Protection Act. Each of these new
mechanisms requires the complainant/plaintiff to establish
that (1) the alleged cybersquatter has registered a domain
name identical or confusingly similar to its trademark; (2) the
alleged cybersquatter has no legitimate rights or interests in
the disputed domain name; and (3) the cybersquatter regis-
tered the domain name in bad faith. Both mechanisms pro-
vide a number of factors that a panel or a court can use to de-
termine if a registration was made in bad faith. A tribunal
will be increasingly likely to find bad faith under the follow-
ing circumstances: (1) if the holder of the domain name has
offered to sell the domain at a price above the cost of registra-
tion; (2) if the disputed domain displays nothing but a counter
and contact information; (3) if the holder did not give truthful
contact information to the registrar; or (4) if the defen-
dant/respondent does not respond to the complaint.
While considerable overlap exists between the legal stan-
dards of the ICANN proceedings and those of the ACPA, im-
portant substantive distinctions exist. In at least two ways,
the ACPA is broader. The ACPA imposes liability upon mere
registration of a domain name in bad faith, where at least
some panels have required the complainant to demonstrate
that the respondent has actually used the domain name.
Moreover, the ACPA explicitly allows rights of publicity to be
asserted against a registrant, and broadens the "confusingly
similar" requirement with the inclusion of "dilutive" marks.
These characteristics can make the ACPA a more powerful
weapon for trademark owners. However, when it comes to
"fair use" issues, courts applying the ACPA are generally
more hesitant to transfer domain names and web sites that
218. Id. at 119.
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criticize trademark owners.
Significant procedural and practical distinctions also ex-
ist between the mechanisms. Due to the potential costs in-
volved with pursuing a case in court, the ICANN system may
be preferred, especially if the complainant's primary goal is
simply to have the domain name transferred. Suing under
the ACPA can become expensive and time consuming if the
defendant answers the complaint and the discovery process
begins. However, the discovery mechanisms afforded by the
ACPA might be valuable in cases where the plaintiff cannot
quickly and easily establish bad faith. If bad faith is not im-
mediately evident from the circumstances of the case, the
ICANN approach may not be the preferred mechanism, given
that an ICANN complainant typically only has one plead-
ing-its complaint-in which to prove its case.
Of course, if a plaintiff seeks money damages to compen-
sate for lost profits or to disgorge the defendant's ill-gotten
profits, then the ACPA is the preferable choice. Or, if the
trademark owner suspects he is dealing with a serious cyber-
squatting enterprise, he may wish to sue under the ACPA in
order to recover statutory damages and attorney's fees. Such
a course of action is more likely to prevent the cybersquatter
from registering other confusingly similar marks that the
trademark owner may not have registered. Furthermore, if
the trademark owner would like to assert other claims
against the alleged cybersquatter, such as state unfair compe-
tition claims, the ACPA is the obvious choice.
In sum, neither of these remedies is necessarily "better"
than the other for parties seeking to enforce their trademark
rights against cybersquatters. The choice between them will
necessarily depend upon the situation, and must be examined
on a case-by-case basis. And, while neither remedy is perfect,
there can be no question that both of these mechanisms have
offered trademark owners with powerful new tools in the on-
going battle against cybersquatters.
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